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REJECTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
UNDER SECTION 1113 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE-
JUDICIAL PRECISION OR ECONOMIC REALITY?
The Honorable Joseph L. Cosetti*
Stanley A. Kirshenbaum**
I. INTRODUCTION
In NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco,' the United States Supreme
Court held that a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding may unilaterally terminate its collective bargaining agree-
ment. 2 Further, the Supreme Court decided that such actions were
not unfair labor practices and set forth the standard a debtor in
possession must meet to reject its union contract.3 Subsequently, a
firestorm erupted in the organized labor community. Union officials
feared a deluge of Chapter 11 bankruptcies by companies seeking to
rid themselves of their obligations under collective bargaining agree-
ments. 4 On that same day, Congressman Rodino of New Jersey
proposed legislation "to clarify the circumstances under which col-
lective bargaining agreements may be rejected." 5 Even prior to the
Courts decision in the Bildisco case, organized labor sought relief
from Congress in response to unilateral contract rejections following
Chapter 11 filings by such recognized companies as Braniff Airlines,
Continental Airlines, Wilson Foods Corp. and Rath Packing Coin-
* B.S, 1951, M.B.A., 1953, Ohio State University; J.D., 1975, Duquesne
University School of Law; Currently Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
** B.A., 1977, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1985, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law; Currently Law Clerk to Judge Cosetti.
1. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
2. Id. at 527-34.
3. Id.
4. Comment, From Legislation to Consternation: Has Section 1113 Really
Changed Bildisco, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 167, (1987); Gibson, The New Law of
Rejection of Collective Bargaining in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113,
58 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1984).
5. H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. H809 (daily ed. Feb.
22, 1984).
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
pany, and the threatened bankruptcy rejection by Eastern Airlines.6
Following the Bildisco decision, organized labor intensified its lob-
bying efforts, while business and creditor interests vigorously lobbied
Congress to sustain the Bildisco decision.
7
The legislative battle to reshape the law of the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements occurred during an uncertain and eventful
period of bankruptcy jurisprudence. Two years earlier, in June 1982,
the Supreme Court had declared the system of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction unconstitutional and gave Congress an opportunity to
redesign it.' Thus, the attempt to overrule Bildisco by legislation
became emeshed with the legislation designed to resolve the consti-
tutionality of the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. All of the resul-
tant 1984 legislation lacks skillful draftsmanship. Section 1113 is no
exception.
Section 1113 created the procedure by which a debtor9 must first
propose modifications in the collective bargaining agreement to the
authorized representative of the debtor's employees. The proposal
must be based upon "the most complete and reliable information
available"10 and must contain only "necessary modifications" which
treat "all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties ...
fairly and equitably."" The debtor must provide "relevant infor-
mation" to enable the employees' representative to evaluate the
proposal.12 Section 1113 also provides for an expedited hearing
6. Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement-A Brief
Lesson in the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AmER. BANKR.
L.J. 293, 305-06, 312 (1984). On February 9, 1984, 15 days before the Bildisco
decision was issued, Congressman Simon introduced H.R. 4858 to "amend the
National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act to modify the circum-
stances under which certain collective bargaining agreements ... may be rejected in
a case under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code." H.R. 4858, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. H707 (daily ed. Feb 9, 1984).
7. Rasnic, Labor's Return from Waterloo: Congressional Response to NLRB
v. Bildisco, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 645-46 (1986); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 312.
8. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982); see infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
9. The technically correct term for a debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding is "debtor in possession." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(l)(1982) provides that
'debtor in possession' means debtor except when a person that is qualified under
§ 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case." For purposes of brevity, "debtor"
will be used for "debtor in possession" throughout this article unless it becomes
necessary to use the technically correct term.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
11. Id.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 11 3(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The court may enter protective
orders to protect the debtor's trade secrets. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
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process13 if the parties are unable to agree on modifications after
"confer[ring] in good faith."'1 4 The court may approve rejection of
the agreement if the debtor's proposal satisfies the above require-
ments, the representative of the employees has rejected the proposal
"without good cause,"' 5 and the "balance of equities clearly favors
rejection of such agreement.'
' 6
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code embodies a compromise
between the desires of organized labor and those of the business and
creditor community. Because it is a compromise, it is loaded with
terms of compromise. Interpretation of terms such as "necessary,"
"fairly and equitably," "good faith," and "good cause" naturally
falls to the courts. Given the ambiguity of the statute, and the tension
inherent in situations where the debtor must seek rejection of its
collective bargaining agreement, the potential for frequent, complex
litigation seems great. In fact, these compromise words and factors
came together in the first case to reach the United States Court of
Appeals, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC.1
7
However, in the real business world, section 1113 may be a non-
issue. There has not been a flood of litigation. The fear by organized
labor that employers would rush to bankruptcy courts to rid them-
selves of unions has not materialized. One of the few such cases,
prior to the enactment of section 1113, was In re Continental Airlines
Corp.8 Continental Airlines unilaterally rejected its collective bar-
gaining agreements and laid off all of its employees immediately
after it filed bankruptcy. 9 Shortly thereafter, it resumed operations
with less than one-half of its employees who were paid at less than
one-half their prior wage rates. 20 The pilots and flight attendants
struck, but the airline survived. 2'
When labor is not well organized, as may have been the case in
Continental, such an outcome is possible. However, when a company
is organized by a strong union, such as the United Steelworkers of
America, the union can force a damaging strike. A debtor struggling
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
17. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes 173-276.
18. 50 Bankr. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd 790 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1986).
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for survival cannot risk a strike and the resultant loss of business.
That was the case in Wheeling-Pittsburgh. Although the case ulti-
mately reached the court of appeals, the real economic issues were
decided at the bargaining table. -
This article will examine the implications of section 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code. First, the article will briefly discuss section 1113
and the events which led to its enactment. Second, the article will
analyze trends in recent cases, suggest parameters for courts to follow
in future cases, and discuss how those parameters will not interfere
with the debtor's ability to reorganize. Finally, although the authors
believe that section 1113 has not been a significant issue in bankruptcy
jurisprudence, the article will propose courses of action for debtors
and employee representatives facing the prospect of rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 1113
A. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco
Much has been written about NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco 2
However, a brief discussion of the case is appropriate at this juncture
to provide the context in which section 1113 was enacted.
Bildisco and Bildisco ("Bildisco"), a New Jersey partnership, filed
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Coderl on April 1,
1980.24 Bildisco was subsequently authorized to operate the business
as debtor in possession.215 At the time Bildisco filed for bankruptcy,
it was subject to a three-year collective bargaining agreement with
Local 408 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the "Union"). 26 In
January 1980, Bildisco breached the collective bargaining agreement
by failing to pay certain health and pension benefits and by failing
to remit union dues withheld from employees. 27 In May 1980, Bildisco
also failed to pay contractually mandated wage increases. In Decem-
ber 1980, Bildisco sought permission to reject the collective bargaining
22. 465 U.S. 513.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982).
24. 465 U.S. at 517.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982).
26. Approximately 40-4507o of Bildisco's employees were members of the
bargaining unit.
27. 465 U.S. at 518.
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agreement pursuant to section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 The
bankruptcy court granted Bildisco's request, 29 and the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The Union appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.3 0
Following Bildisco's breach of the collective bargaining agreement,
but prior to Bildisco's attempt to reject the agreement, the Union
filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB"). 3I The NLRB ultimately found "that Bildisco had
violated section 8(a)(5) and section 8(a)(1) of the [National Labor
Relations Act] by unilaterally changing the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement and by refusing to negotiate with the Union,"
and ordered Bildisco to take appropriate remedial action.32
The NLRB petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
to enforce its order.13 The Union's appeal of the bankruptcy order
was consolidated with the NLRB's petition for enforcement.14 The
court of appeals declared that a collective bargaining agreement is
an executory contract which may be rejected through section 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.35 However, the court recognized that col-
lective bargaining agreements are afforded special status, even though
the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly treat them differently. 36
Consequently, the court declined to utilize the normal test for rejec-
tion of an executory contract, the business judgment test.37 Rather,
the court adopted the standard set forth in Shopmen's Local Union
No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.3 8 In that case, the court stated
28. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). This section states, in pertinent part, that
"the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory
contract ... of the debtor."
29. The Union was given 30 days to file a claim for damages resulting from
the breach of contract.
30. 465 U.S. at 51 8.
31. Id.
32. 465 U.S. at 519. Section (8)(a) of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982), provides, inter alia, that "[it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 157 of this title; ... (5) to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ......
33. The NLRB lacks enforcement powers; it must petition the appropriate
United States Court of Appeals to enforce its orders. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
34.. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1982).
35. Id. at 78.
36. Id. at 79.
37. Id.
38. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
1987]
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that a debtor may reject a collective bargaining agreement "only
after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on
both sides ...." 3 9 The Union and the NLRB unsuccessfully argued
that a union contract could be rejected only upon "a showing 'that
an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining agree-
ment will thwart efforts the save a [debtor] ... from collapse.'
' 4
The Bildisco court of appeals refused to enforce the NLRB's
order, 41 criticizing the NLRB's contention that the debtor in posses-
sion was bound by the collective bargaining agreement because it
was an alter ego of the pre-petition employer. 42 Rather, the court
stated that "as a matter of law, a debtor in possession is '[a] new
entity ... created with its own rights and duties, subject to the
supervision of the bankruptcy court."' 43 As a new entity, similar to
a successor employer of a profitable business, Bildisco was not subject
to the collective bargaining agreement and thus "had the ability to
reject the agreement without following the procedures outlined in
section 8(d)." 44
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the
conflict between the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in REA
Express5 and the Third Circuit in Bildisco.46 The Supreme Court
first recited that none of the parties disputed that a collective bar-
gaining agreement is an executory contract, as that term is used in
section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 47 Since such agreements were
not expressly exempted from the scope of section 365(a), the Court
39. Id. at 707 (quoting In re Overseas National Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359,
361 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)).
40. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79 (quoting Brotherhood of Railway, Airline
and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976)).
41. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 85.
42. Id. at 82.
43. Id. (quoting Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704).
44. Id. at 83.
45. 523 F.2d 164.
46. 465 U.S. at 521.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). This generally had not been a disputed issue.
See West, Life After Bildisco: § 1113 and the Duty to Bargain, 47 OmIO ST. L.J.
65, 88 (1986).
However, as amicus curiae, the United Mine Workers of America argued that
a collective bargaining agreement is not an executory contract within the context of
§ 365(a). The Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not define "executory
contract," but that "Congress intended the term to mean a contract 'on which
performance remains due to some extent on both sides."' 465 U.S. at 522 n.6
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
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concluded "that Congress intended that section 365(a) apply to all
collective bargaining agreements covered by the NLRA. ' ' 41
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Third Circuit that
"the business judgement" test is an insufficient standard for rejecting
collective bargaining agreements. 49 However, like the Third Circuit,
the Supreme Court rejected the REA Express standard which requires
adoption of the prior collective bargaining agreement, unless rejection
provides the only means for preventing the failure of the reorgani-
zation.50 Such a standard, the Court stated, is "fundamentally at
odds with the policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code."'" Rather, the debtor should be allowed to
reject its collective bargaining agreement upon a "show[ing] that the
collective bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after
careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor
contract.15 2 This was the standard adopted by the Third Circuit in
Bildisco, and by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Brada Miller Freight
System, Inc." The Court added that the bankruptcy court should be
satisfied that the debtor and the employees' representative have made
reasonable efforts to negotiate voluntary modifications, but the bank-
ruptcy court need not determine that the parties have bargained to
impasse.5 4 If the parties are unable to agree on modifications, the
court may allow rejection. 55 At that time, the court must make a
reasoned finding on the record as to whether rejection should be
permitted and should consider the following factors:
[The] likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent
rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims that would follow
from affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them, and
the impact of rejection on the employees. In striking the balance, the
Bankruptcy Court must consider not only the degree of hardship faced
by each party, but also any qualitative differences between the types
of hardship each may face.5 6
48. 465 U.S. at 522-23. Section 1167(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1167(a) (1982), exempts collective bargaining agreements' subject to the Railway
Labor Act from rejection pursuant to § 365. The Court reasoned that Congress
knew how to draft an exemption to § 365(a) if it so chose. Id.
49. 465 U.S. at 523.
50. Id. at 524-25. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51. 465 U.S. at 525.
52. Id. at 526.
53. 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983).
54. 465 U.S. 526.
55. Id. At that stage of the proceedings, the Court noted, the policies of the
National Labor Relations Act have been adequately served.
56. Id. at 527.
19871
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In considering these factors, the court must focus on reorganization,
"the ultimate goal of Chapter 11."
7
The Supreme Court then considered whether a debtor commits an
unfair labor practice by unilaterally rejecting or modifying a collective
bargaining agreement.18 The Supreme Court discounted the "new
entity" analysis used by the court of appeals,5 9 but ruled that a
debtor does not violate sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA by
failing to honor any term of the contract, from the date of filing
the bankruptcy petition until formal acceptance of the contract 60 In
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor has until confirmation of the
reorganization to decide whether to accept or reject an executory
contract. 61 Rejection of an unassumed contract relates back to the
date immediately preceding the filing of the petition. 62 The automatic
stay63 prevents an action for breach of contract. Therefore, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
means that the agreement is "no longer immediately enforceable,
and may never be enforceable again." 64 Consequently, the NLRB "is
precluded from ... enforcing the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement by filing unfair labor practice charges ... for violating
section 8(d) of the NLRA .... [T]he practical effect of the enforce-
ment action would be to require adherence to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.
' 6
Four justices dissented from the Court's holding that the debtor
does not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally modifying
the labor contract before it has been authorized to do so by the
bankruptcy court. 66 The first part of the decision, which established
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 528.
60. Id. at 532.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1982). Claims arising from a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement are dealt with through the normal bankruptcy process for
determining claims. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. 1986).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
64. 465 U.S. at 532.
65. Id. The Court stated that such a result would run directly counter to the
express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Code's overall effort to give a
debtor in possession some flexibility and breathing space. For the same reasons, the
Court also refused to require the debtor to satisfy the requirements for mid-term
contract modifications of § 8(d) of the NRLA.
66. Id. at 539 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The dissent pointed out that "no
provision of [the] Code ... purports to render § 8(d) inapplicable ..." notwithstanding
the majority's assertion that "enforcement of ... § 8(d) ... in the post-filing period
'would run directly counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.'
188 [Vol. 26:181
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the standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements, was a
unanimous decision. It was not thought to be as controversial as the
second part, 67 dealing with the question of unfair labor practices,
which was the main impetus for the enactment of section 1113.
B. The Constitutional Crisis in the Bankruptcy System and the
Enactment of Section 1113
The enactment of section 1113 was a major skirmish within the
larger campaign to create a bankruptcy system that would pass
constitutional muster. Two years earlier, in Marathon Pipe Line,6
the United States Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional. To avoid impairing the
administration of the bankruptcy laws, the Court declined to apply
the decision retroactively, and stayed its judgment until October 4,
1982 to "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bank-
ruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication .... ,,69
Although the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the bank-
ruptcy system in July 1982, Congress was unable to meet the Court's
deadline. The Supreme Court then extended its stay until December
24, 1982, but Congress still did not act. The Court refused to grant
an additional continuance.
Following the expiration of the stay in Marathon Pipe Line, the
Judicial Conference of the United States promulgated an interim
67. Gibson, supra note 4, at 326; West, supra note 47, at 90.
68. 458 U.S. 50. Prior to 1978, bankruptcy courts were endowed with limited
jurisdiction. In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, which inter alia,
expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) and (c)
gave the bankruptcy courts "the jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
Title 11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11." In effect, Congress gave
bankruptcy court judges many of the powers of Article III judges, but none of the
protections (lifetime tenure, removal only through impeachment by Congress, and
salaries which may not be reduced). Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress
to create other inferior tribunals such as the bankruptcy courts. These courts lack
the protections of Article III courts.
In Marathon, Northern Pipeline, a Chapter 11 debtor, brought an action in
bankruptcy court against Marathon for various state law causes of action. Marathon
moved for dismissal, asserting that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 unconstitutionally conferred
Article III powers on bankruptcy judges. The bankruptcy court denied the motion
to dismiss, but the district court reversed the bankruptcy court. The debtor and the
United States appealed to the Supreme Court. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme
Court concluded that the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts was
unconstitutional because it gave Article III responsibilities to judges lacking the
constitutional safeguards of Article III.
69. 458 U.S. at 88.
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rule, which was adopted by the judicial council for each circuit and
ultimately by the district courts. 70 Following the Bildisco decision,
organized labor renewed its efforts to have Congress address the
issue of the rejection of collective bargaining agreements during
Chapter 11 proceedings. The business and creditor community lobbied
Congress to maintain the salutary effects of Bildisco. Concurrently,
the March 31, 1984 expiration of the interim rule was approaching.
The initial attempts to address the problem, as perceived by or-
ganized labor, were naturally very restrictive. To preclude employers
from filing Chapter 11 for the purpose of rejecting union contracts,
H.R. 485871 imposed a solvency test on debtors. The Rodino measure,
H.R. 4908,72 imposed substantially the same requirements as those
imposed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in REA
Express.73 Additionally, the collective bargaining agreement rejection
provision of H.R. 4908 was retroactive.
Congressman Rodino subsequently introduced another measure to
reconstitute the bankruptcy system, H.R. 5174.74 H.R. 5174 contained
a proposed section 1113, dealing with the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements. Procedurally, that section was substantially
similar to the measure which was ultimately enacted. Substantively,
however, the proposed section 1113 contained the REA Express
standard for rejection, but was not retroactive.
On March 31, 1984, the interim rule on jurisdiction was to expire.
Until Congress ultimately enacted corrective legislation, on June 28,
1984, it was required to extend the transition period and interim rule
several times. 75 In May 1984, two proposals dealing with collective
70. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 312. The interim rule was to expire March
31, 1984. The interim rule provided that all cases under Title ll,arising under Title
11, or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 were automatically referred to
bankruptcy judges, but the reference could be withdrawn. In related proceedings,
absent consent of the parties, the bankruptcy court could not enter final orders; the
bankruptcy court could only submit findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
proposed order to the district court. All orders entered by the bankruptcy court
were subject to de novo review by the district court.
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
73. 523 F.2d 164; see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
74. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. H1727 (1984). This
proposed legislation sought to grant Article III status to bankruptcy judges. Previ-
ously Congressman Rodino had introduced similar legislation. See H.R. 3, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H40 (1983).
75. For a detailed description of the atmosphere and activity in Congress
surrounding the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, see Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 312-21.
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bargaining agreements were introduced in the Senate: the "Thur-
mond substitute" and the "Packwood amendment". 76 The Thurmond
substitute, 7 inter alia, maintained the Bildisco standard of balancing
the equities. The proposal required that before a debtor could reject
a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor and the employees'
representative make reasonable efforts to reach a voluntary agree-
ment, that such efforts be unlikely to produce satisfactory results,
and that the inability to reach an agreement threaten the likelihood
of successful reorganization.78 Additionally, the debtor could not
unilaterally terminate the contract for thirty days after filing a motion
to reject, during which time the bankruptcy court would hold a
hearing on rejection. 79 The Thurmond substitute was not retroactive. 0
The Packwood amendment" l required the debtor to propose the
minimum modifications to enable the reorganization to succeed. Such
modifications would be based on the debtor's best estimate of the
necessary sacrifices required of creditors and other affected parties .82
The Packwood amendment would further require the debtor to supply
the union with the information necessary to evaluate the proposal.83
As with the Thurmond substitute, the parties would be required to
attempt to agree on modifications.8 4 If the debtor made a sufficient
proposal which the union unjustifiably refused, then the balance of
equities would favor rejection. 5 The Packwood amendment provided
for an expedited hearing and decision, and was retroactive.
8 6
The Senate was unable to agree on either proposal. The Senate
passed the Thurmond substitute on June 19, 1984, but without
including its provision on collective bargaining agreements. 7 The
House and Senate conferred on the final version of the legislation,
but the Conference Committee was unable to agree on legislation by
the time the last extension and the 1982 Emergency Rule finally
76. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 316.
77. 130 Cong. Rec. S6081 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
78. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 317.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 130 Cong. Rec. S6181-82 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).




86. Id. at 317-18.
87. 130 Cong. Rec. S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
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expired on June 27, 1984.88 On June 28, 1984, at close to 3:00 a.m.,
the House and Senate Conference Committee agreed on a compromise
bill, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984,' 9 which included provisions modifying the Bildisco decision.
The conference report was approved by the full House of Represen-
tatives and Senate, 90 and was ultimately signed by the President.
C. What was Congress' Intent
Section 1113 corrected what organized labor found to be the most
odious portion of the Bildisco decision-a debtor's unfettered ability
to unilaterally reject a collective bargaining agreement. 9' Although
section 1113 does not address the issue as it arose within the Bildisco
decision, whether unilateral rejection is an unfair labor practice,
"[n]o provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to
unilaterally terminate or alter any provision of a collective bargaining
agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section. "92
To avoid its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, a
debtor must now satisfy the following prerequisites:
(A) [M]ake a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees
covered by such agreement, based upon the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of such proposal, which provides for
those necessary modifications in the employees' benefits and protec-
tions that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and
assures that all creditors, the debtor and all the affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) Provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the
employees with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate
the proposal. 93
Once the debtor satisfies these requirements, the bankruptcy court
"shall" approve rejection 94 if it finds "the authorized representative
88. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 318. The United States Judicial Conference
implemented a second emergency plan to keep the bankruptcy courts operating.
Under this plan, the bankruptcy judges were to serve as consultants to the district
court.
89. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 390.
90. 130 Cong. Rec. H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
91. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, The New Bankruptcy Procedures for Re-
jection of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is the Pendulum Swinging Back?, 23
DUQ. L. REv. 939, 950 (1985).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
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of the employees has refused to accept such proposal without good
cause" 9 and "the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of
such agreement." 96 The court must hold a hearing within fourteen
days of the filing of the application for rejection 97 and must issue a
decision within thirty days of the commencement of the hearing.98 If
the court fails to issue a timely decision, only then may the debtor
unilaterally reject the contract.9 Section 1113 also enables the court
to authorize the debtor to implement interim changes, notwithstand-
ing a pending application to reject, "if essential to the continuation
of the debtor's business," or "to avoid irreparable damage to the
estate." '00
The procedural requirements of section 1113 are straightforward;
the substantive requirements, however, are not. Although Congress
appears to have codified the Bildisco standard for rejection, questions
of interpretation naturally remain, because "necessary," "good faith,"
"fairly and equitably," and "good cause" are not defined by the
statute. The legislative history is sparse, and thus is of limited value
in determining Congress' intentions. The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees did not publish a joint explanatory statement or report.
The only legislative history consists of inconsistent statements made
to the Congress by some members of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. 0 1 In such circumstances, such statements may not "re-
flect the collective intent or will of Congress."' 10 2
Thus, we turn to the language of section 1113. We first examine
the term "necessary." The litigation which has ensued from section
1113 has frequently involved interpretation of this word. 0 It should
95. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). This section also provides that
the "court may extend the time for commencement of such hearing for a period
not exceeding seven days" or for additional periods of time by agreement between
the debtor and the union.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). By agreement of the parties, the
court may extend the time in which it may render a decision.
99. Id.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. IV 1986). The court may allow interim
changes only after notice and a hearing.
101. 130 Cong. Rec. H7489-97 and S8897-8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984),
reprinted in, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 576-605.
102. Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las
Vegas (In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.), 78 Bankr. 575, 583 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1987); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984).
103. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
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be noted that "necessary" appears twice within section 11 13(b)(l)(A). °4
The debtor must propose only "necessary modifications" to the
collective bargaining agreement "that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor." 05
Congress did not specify the standard to be used in evaluating
whether proposed changes are "necessary." Organized labor favored
the stringent standard of REA Express,1' while business and creditor
interests favored the Bildisco standard.10° However, the legislative
history does not indicate that Congress adopted the REA Express
standard. The legislation proposed by Congressman Rodino, 10 8 which
incorporated the REA Express standard, was not enacted. Nor was
Senator Packwood's proposed legislation adopted. That proposal
provided that the debtor propose "minimum modifications."' 1 9 Rather,
Congress' use of the "necessary" clause, together with its non-use
of the language of the Rodino and Packwood proposals indicates
that it did not use the REA Express standard. Additionally, in the
subsection providing for interim relief," 0 Congress deliberately used
the term "essential" where it desired to implement the REA Express
standard."' Thus, Congress knew how to adopt the REA Express
standard if it chose to do so. Congress' failure to use the term
"essential" instead of the term "necessary" in section 1113(b)(1)(A)
demonstrates that Congress did not adopt the REA Express stan-
dard. 112
Clearly, the changes in the contract which the debtor proposes
must focus on a successful reorganization." 3 Senator Packwood
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
105. Id.
106. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 5 and 72 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying note 81.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. IV 1986) states, in pertinent part, that "when
the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to
the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may ... implement interim changes
111. See 130 Cong. Rec. H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Morrison); See also 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Packwood).
112. This argument was rejected as "hyper-technical" by the Third Circuit in
Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1088; see infra text accompanying
note 258.




articulated this concept during the debate on the conference com-
mittee's report: "The debtor will not be able to exploit the bankruptcy
procedure to rid itself of unwanted features of the labor agreement
that have no relation to its financial condition and its reorganization
which were earlier agreed to by the debtor. ' " 4 Modifications to the
collective bargaining agreement which result in easily quantifiable
cost savings are more likely to constitute "necessary" modifications.
However, a showing by the debtor that the proposed changes will
result in cost savings, by itself, is insufficient to meet the requirement
of necessity. Such savings must be necessary to the debtor's reorgan-
ization."' Examples of changes which are likely to be found to be
necessary include changes in wages, health insurance, pension fund
contributions, vacations, and paid holidays. It is less clear whether
changes in the collective bargaining agreement which cannot be
measured as easily in dollars, such as changes in seniority and work
rules, will be construed as necessary."
6
In a statement on the conference report, Senator Hatch injected a
note of pragmatism into the process envisioned by section 1113. He
noted that at the time a debtor would be likely to file an application
to reject pursuant to section 1113, the debtor's reorganization plan
would still be in the formative stages: "The conference also discussed
at length its intent that this provision not become an attempt to
devise an entire reorganization plan at a premature stage. We were
all aware of the impossibility of even identifying all the creditors and
their interests at this early stage of the reorganization effort." 1" 7
Consequently, the term "necessary" must be viewed within this
context.
We next consider the meaning of the phrase "fairly and equitably."
Section 11 13(b)(1)(A) requires that the debtor's proposal treat "all
creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties ... fairly and
equitably." "8 The legislative history reveals that this language was
114. 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood).
115. See, e.g., In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (D. Minn. 1984).
There, the court denied rejection because the proposed changes would have saved
the debtor only 2% of it monthly operating expenses; see infra text accompanying
notes 140-150.
116. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 91, at 953; West, supra note
47, at 110.
117. 130 Cong. Rec. S8991 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in, 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 593.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
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meant to ensure that the burden does not fall unfairly on a particular
group of employees or other parties. Senator Packwood favored this
language to assure "that the focus for cost cutting must not be
directed exclusively at unionized workers. Rather, the burden of
sacrifices ... will be spread among all affected parties." 9 Senator
Packwood believed that this provision would make the proposed
modifications more palatable to the union employees; they would
not feel that only they were making sacrifices to preserve the debtor.
As an example of how the "fairly and equitably" requirement
should be applied, Senator Packwood referred approvingly to In re
Blue Ribbon Transportation Co. Inc. 20 In that case, the bankruptcy
court agreed that successful reorganization required a rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement. However, the court noted that
management wages and benefits were also excessive. The court con-
ditioned rejection of the collective bargaining agreement on com-
mensurate reductions in management costs.'
2'
Other members of the conference committee attached a different
meaning to this provision. Those who were less sympathetic to labor's
position122 believed that this language would prevent non-union em-
ployees from bearing a disproportionate burden of the reorganization.
As stated by Senator Thurmond, "[tihis phrase clearly includes,
however, all non-union employees of the debtor whose interests
should be as carefully considered by the court as those of anyunion
employees." 1
23
Between the time the debtor proposes modifications to the collective
bargaining agreement and the hearing on the application for rejection,
the debtor must "meet, at reasonable times with the authorized
representative to confer in good faith ... to reach mutually satisfac-
tory modifications .... "124 The good faith requirement originated in
119. 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood).
120. 30 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983).
121. Id. at 786-87. (The court noted that management was overstaffed, as well
as overpaid).
122. Senator Thurmond, for example, believed that Bildisco was correctly
decided. However, he agreed to the enactment of § 1113 because of the "critical
need to pass this bankruptcy bill ...." 130 Cong. Rec. S8887 (statement of Sen.
Thurmond), reprinted in, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 582.
123. 130 Cong. Rec. S8888 (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in, 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 583.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
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Bildisco 25 and Congress intended to maintain that requirement. 26 A
large body of precedent defines "good faith" within labor law
jurisprudence. Congress, mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition
in Bildisco that bankruptcy courts should avoid areas outside their
expertise, 2 7 has proscribed the bankruptcy courts from using such
precedents, 2s but has not provided an alternate definition. One
commentator has suggested that Congress intended the courts to
interpret the "good faith" requirement in a non-technical fashion
limited to a determination of whether the debtor seriously attempted
to reach an agreement with the union. 129 This suggested interpretation
is consistent with Bildisco's requirement that the parties bargain, but
not to impasse.
If an agreement cannot be reached rejection will be allowed, but
the court must first find that the union has refused to accept the
debtor's proposal "without good cause."' 30 The statute fails to define
the phrase "without good cause," nor is it defined in the NLRA or
anywhere else in bankruptcy law.' It is logical to assume that
"without good cause" somehow parallels "in bad faith."'' 3 2 Senator
Packwood's comments support this position: "The 'without good
cause' langauge provides an incentive or pressure on the debtor to
negotiate in good faith .... [The] language serves to prohibit any bad
faith conduct by the employer, while at the same time protecting the
employer from a union's rejection of the proposal without good
cause."' 33 Thus, the "without good cause" requirement is an indirect
125. 465 U.S. at 526 ("[The Bankruptcy Court should be persuaded that
reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made and are
not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.")
126. 130 Cong. Rec. S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in, 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 593.
127. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526-27.
128. See infra note 131.
129. Gibson, supra note 4, at 330.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
131. See Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 91, at 974; West, supra note
47, at 133. Senator Thurmond feared that the requirement that the "union refusal
to accept the proposal be 'without good cause' would import traditional labor law
concepts into a bankruptcy forum or turn the bankruptcy courts into a version of
the National Labor Relations Board." 130 Cong. Rec. S8888 (statement of Sen.
Thurmond), reprinted in, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 583.
132. Perhaps the drafters meant to say "in bad faith" instead of "without
good cause," but inadvertently used the wrong terminology. It should be remembered
that the conferees reached agreement at 3:00 a.m.




and somewhat redundant demand that the parties bargain in good
faith.
In addition to requiring that the union bargain in good faith, some
commentators have suggested that the phrase "without good cause"
imposes substantive requirements on the union's bargaining posture.
For example, if the debtor, in good faith, makes a proposal which
it believes contains only "necessary" modifications, but the union,
in good faith, makes a counterproposal containing what it believes
to be only "necessary" modifications, does this constitute rejec-
tion"without good cause"? 134 If the debtor's proposal satisfies section
1113(b)(1), must the union compromise its position?'35
Even if the union has not shown good cause the court must also
find that the "balance of equities clearly favors rejection.' ' 3 6 Con-
gress made it clear that it was adopting the standard for rejection
set forth in Bildisco.137 However, Congress modified the Bildisco
standard by mandating that the balance of equities "clearly" favors
rejection. This is to ensure that rejection is not allowed when the
balance of the equities does not favor one side or the other: "The
word 'clearly' is merely intended to assure that rejection is not
warranted where the equities balance exactly equally on each side
"3.... "I Other than those comments, Congress failed to further elu-
cidate the concept of "balance of equities.'
' 39
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1113
A. Initial Interpretation by the Bankruptcy Courts
The first reported decision interpreting section 1113 was In re
American Provision Company. 4 There, the court determined that
section 1113 creates nine requirements for rejection:
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the union to
modify the collective bargaining agreement.
134. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 341; West, supra note 47, at 131.
135. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 91, at 964.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
137. 130 Cong. Rec. S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in, 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 594; 130 Cong. Rec. S8890 (statement of Sen. Dole),
reprinted in, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 588. For a list of the factors
to be considered in "balancing the equities," see supra text accompanying note 56.
138. 130 Cong. Rec. S8992 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in, 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 594.
139. Ehrenwerth and Lally-Green, supra note 91, at 965.
140. 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
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2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of the proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reor-
ganization of the debtor.
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
5. The debtor must provide to the union such relevant information as
is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of
the hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at reasonable times with
the union.
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting
to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining
agreement.
8. The union must have refused to accept the proposal without good
cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement. 14'
The court also noted that the debtor bears the initial burden of
persuasion, by a preponderance of the evidence, on all nine ele-
ments. 142 However, the court stated that after an initial showing of
the nine factors by the debtor, the burden of producing evidence
shifts to the union with respect to three of the nine elements.14 First,
after the debtor shows what information it has provided to the union,
the union must then produce evidence that the information provided
"was not the relevant information which was necessary for it to
evaluate the proposal."' 44 Second, after the debtor shows that it has
met with the union's representatives, the union must "produce evi-
dence that the debtor did not confer in good faith."'1 45 Finally, once
the debtor shows that the union refused to accept its proposal, "the
union must produce evidence that it was not without good cause."' 1
141. Id. at 909. Several other cases have adopted, or referred to, the nine-
step analysis of this case. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d
1074; In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); In re
Cook United, 50 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). But see In re Royal
Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd 78 Bankr.
671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("This court eschews the talismanic nine-step analysis ... first
used in In re American Provision Co ....").
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 909-10.
145. Id. at 910.
146. Id.
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Although American Provision is frequently cited for its statement
of the nine requirements for rejecting a collective bargaining agree-
ment, it is also an important case because it represents the first
attempt to define "necessary" within the context of section 1113.147
At the time of its application to reject, the debtor employed only
two union employees. 48 The court stated that the proposed savings
to the debtor, as a result of rejection, would equal 2% of the debtor's
monthly operating expenses. 49 Consequently, the court stated that it
could not find such de minimis savings were necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor. 50
In re K & B Mounting, Inc.' is another case in which the
bankruptcy court refused to find that the debtor's proposed modi-
fications were necessary.5 2 There, pre-petition, the debtor began an
austerity program, which included purchasing equipment for cash
rather than on credit.' 53 Consequently, the debtor had no secured
debt; its only major obligations were to the union's health, welfare
and pension plans. 54 The debtor's proposed modifications to the
collective bargaining agreement included wage reductions and sus-
pension of payments under the welfare and pension plans.' In those
circumstances, the court could not conclude that the proposed mod-
ifications were necessary, since the debtor failed to "substantiate its
proposal with 'relevant' information selected from 'the most complete
and reliable information available' ....-1"'6 Rather, the court criticized
the debtor for attempting to modify the collective bargaining agree-
ment with nothing more than unsupported allegations of serious cash
flow problems. 5 7 The court also found that the debtor's unique
financial situation, in which its only obligations were to the union's
pension, health, and welfare funds, could not constitute fair and




150. Id. The court also disallowed rejection because the debtor failed to meet
its burden of proving that it had bargained in good faith. See infra text accompanying
note 321.
151. 50 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
152. Id. at 467.
153. Id. at 468.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 467.
156. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A)).
157. 50 Bankr. at 467-68.
158. Id. at 468.
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good cause to reject the debtor's proposal. 59 The court indicated
that although a debtor may not like its collective bargaining agree-
ment, such reasons are clearly insufficient grounds for rejection:
"[Tlhe test, in justifying ... the proposed modifications, is necessity,
not convenience or desirability." 160
Similarly, in In re Cook United, Inc. ,161 the court refused to find
that the debtor's proposed modifications were necessary, in light of
positive cash flow of $1.9 million in the debtor's plan of reorgani-
zation, even without the proposed changes in the contract. 62 The
court also found that the proposed changes did not treat all of the
affected parties fairly and equitably since the proposed changes had
a disproportionate impact on the lowest paid union employees.1 63 The
debtor, creditors, and other unionized employees were not subjected
to the same level of sacrifices as were the lowest paid employees.
64
The court also noted that the debtor's management failed to take
any pay cuts.
65
The first reported decision in which a bankruptcy court examined
the term "necessary" and allowed rejection was In re Allied Delivery
System Co.16 In determining that the debtor's proposed modifications
were necessary, the court addressed an argument that would later be
raised in Wheeling-Pittsburgh67 - whether "necessary" means "es-
sential." The court emphasized that section 11 13(b)(1)(A) differed
significantly from the original proposal in the House of Represen-
tatives, which would have required a finding by the bankruptcy court
that the reorganization would fail and the employees would lose their
jobs unless the contract was rejected. 16 The court added that sub-
section (e) of section 1113 "requires that the debtor show that the
requested relief is 'essential to the continuation of the debtor's
business' or is needed 'to avoid irreparable damage to the estate
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 50 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
162. Id. at 563.
163. Id. at 564.
164. Id. The employees, who the court found would be the most burdened by
the modifications, were members of various locals of the United Food and Com-
mercial Workers Union. The debtor's other unionized employees, who were subjected
to less severe cuts, were members of one Teamsters local.
165. Id. at 565.
166. 49 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Ohio 1985).
167. 791 F.2d 1074.
168. 49 Bankr. at 702.
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... ".'169 A fortiori, the court reasoned that if Congress intended to
adopt a stricter test, it knew how to do SO.
1 70
The court also analyzed the term "necessary" in connection with
the requirement of good faith negotiations. If the debtor proposed
modifications which were limited to those that were essential to its
survival, and then moderated its demands as part of the negotiating
process, it would be "subject to a finding that any substantial
lessening of the demands made in the original proposal proves that
the original proposal's modifications were not 'necessary."" '1 7 It is
not difficult to see how the court found that the debtor's proposed
modifications were necessary. The union contract provided for labor
costs which constituted 87% of the debtor's gross revenues.
72
B. The Third Circuit Explores the Issue- Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO-CLC, 73 was the first case in which a court of appeals
considered section 1113. The Third Circuit reversed the bankruptcy
court's allowance of rejection, and the district court's affirmance,
holding that the debtor's proposal was not limited to necessary
modifications.174 In doing so, the court of appeals concluded, inter
alia, that "necessary" within the context of section 1113 is tanta-
mount to "essential."' ' 75 The court also found that the debtor's
proposal did not treat all parties "fairly and equitably," because it
failed to contain a "snap back" provision. 76 The Third Circuit's
opinion has not been followed outside that circuit.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh exemplifies the legal maxim "hard cases make
bad law." At the time of the bankruptcy, Wheeling-Pittsburgh was
the largest debtor ever to utilize section 1113. The debtor and union
had particularly rancorous labor-management relations. 77 At the time




172. Id. The court added that labor costs and current pension and welfare
obligations potentially exceeded the debtor's gross revenues. Id.
173. 791 F.2d 1074.
174. Id. at 1085.
175. Id. at 1088.
176. Id. at 1090.
177. Id. at 1077-78.
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the seventh largest steelmaker in the country.'7 During the late 1970's,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh extensively modernized its facilities. Some of its
facilities were modern and efficient, but as a result it became heavily
indebted.' 79 The company lost money in 1982, 1983, and 1984.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh's losses, coupled with the need to make pay-
ments on the modernization loans, severely impaired the company's
financial condition.' 80
Twice in 1982, Wheeling-Pittsburgh asked for concessions from its
union, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC ("Steel-
workers").' 81 At the time that it asked for the initial concessions,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh's average gross labor costs were near the indus-
try average of approximately $25 per hour.'8 2 In April of 1982, the
Steelworkers granted Wheeling-Pittsburgh a reduction in labor costs
of $1.65 per hour. As a quid pro quo, the employees were entitled
to preferred stock.'
83
In December 1982, the Steelworkers again granted concessions, as
part of a new three-and-one-half year collective bargaining agree-
ment.' Labor costs were reduced again. In return, Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh created a profit-sharing plan.8 5 This new agreement provided
for recovery of the concessions, so that the average labor costs would
be $25 per hour at the end of the contract term.'86 At the end of
1984, Wheeling-Pittsburgh again asked for concessions-the cancel-
lation of all scheduled restorations. The Steelworkers agreed to defer
restoration, pending review by its accountants of Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh's financial reports. After consulting with its accountants, the
Steelworkers agreed to defer concessions indefinitely.187
178. Id. at 1076.
179. Id. The court noted that Wheeling-Pittsburgh's long term debts grew
from $170 million at the end of 1979 to $527 million at the end of 1984. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1077.
182. Id. at 1076-77. Gross labor costs include wages, benefits, current pension
costs and other retiree benefits, and payroll taxes. Traditionally, Wheeling-Pittsburgh
and the other major steel producers bargained as a group with the Steelworkers.
Thus, Wheeling-Pittsburgh's average gross labor costs were substantially the same
as the other major steel producers. Id. at 1076.
183. Id. at 1077.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Labor costs were reduced to a minimum of $18.60, although the
exact amount was disputed. The gradual restorations provided, for example, that
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In January 1985, Wheeling-Pittsburgh requested concessions for
the fourth time.'88 This time, however, the Steelworkers refused to
grant further concessions until Wheeling-Pittsburgh obtained conces-
sions from its lenders, a very astute reaction from a bankruptcy
point of view. Previously, the lenders had not made any concessions.
Thereafter, Wheeling-Pittsburgh issued a restructuring proposal, which
sought to obtain concessions from the lenders8 9 and shareholders' 9°
as well as the Steelworkers.' 9' Wheeling-Pittsburgh had not proposed
to pledge its current assets as collateral for past debts. The Steel-
workers considered this crucial to the company's survival. 192 It feared
that if Wheeling-Pittsburgh "pledged the current assets, the company
would have no 'life preserver' and thus go under (taking the em-
ployees' jobs with it) in the event of an economic downturn."' 93 In
fact, the Steelworkers' counterproposal insisted that Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh promise not to pledge its current assets to the banks. 94 This
was prudent bankruptcy bargaining prior to the bankruptcy filing.
The lenders counterproposed that Wheeling-Pittsburgh pledge its
current assets, in return for deferring present indebtedness and pro-
viding additional credit. 95 Wheeling-Pittsburgh was ready to concede
to the lenders! 196 The attempted restructuring outside of bankruptcy
failed. 197 The Steelworkers and the lenders would not retreat from
188. Id.
189. Id. Wheeling-Pittsburgh asked all of its lenders for a moratorium on
principal payments in 1985 and 1986. It also asked some of its lenders for an
additional moratorium of 50% for 1987 through 1989 and/or reductions in interest
payments. In return, the lenders were to receive common stock. Id.
190. Id. Wheeling-Pittsburgh proposed continuing the suspension of preferred
stock dividends, eliminating pre-emptive rights, and diluting the stockholders' present
holdings. Id.
191. Id. Wheeling-Pittsburgh asked the Steelworkers for a labor cost of
approximately $19 per hour for three years and cancellation of the scheduled
restorations. In return, the employees were to receive preferred or common stock.
Id.
192. Id.
193. Brief for Appellant at 7, Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d
at 1074.
194. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F. 2d at 1077. The Steelworkers'
counterproposal offered a two year contract with labor costs of $19.50 the first
year and $20 the second year and cancellation of scheduled restorations. In return,
the employees were to receive common stock and the right to appoint a member to
Wheeling-Pittsburgh's Board of Directors. Id.
195. Id. Current assets consisted of accounts receivable and inventory, then
worth $300,000 million. The lenders proposed to defer $210 million and lend an




their respective positions on the current assets. 98 The Steelworkers
lost confidence in management's good faith and ability to protect
their interests. Wheeling-Pittsburgh filed for relief under Chapter 11
on April 16, 1985.199
On May 9, 1985 Wheeling-Pittsburgh proposed to the Steelworkers
the following modifications of the collective bargaining agreement:
a five-year contract term; a maximum average labor cost of $15.20;
elimination of the profit-sharing plan; reduction in medical and
insurance benefits; elimination of supplemental and insurance bene-
fits; and, elimination of various obligations including payments of
the pension plan, redemption fund, and cash dividends on preferred
stock.2 0 0 Wheeling-Pittsburgh's projected business scenario for the
next five years was becoming more pessimistic.
201
The Steelworkers' financial consultants unsuccessfully sought cer-
tain financial data from Wheeling-Pittsburgh .202 Notwithstanding
Wheeling-Pittsburgh's ultimatum to either accept or reject the pro-
posal, the Steelworkers maintained that they could not respond until
their financial consultants received the information that they de-




The bankruptcy court used the nine-step analysis from American
Provision for rejection. 20 5 First, the court recited that the debtor
submitted a proposal and negotiated with the Steelworkers, pursuant
to section 1113.206 The court then rejected the Steelworkers' conten-
tions that the debtor failed to confer in good faith to reach mutually
satisfactory modifications. The Steelworkers asserted that Wheeling
Pittsburgh "waited only three weeks after submitting the ... proposal
to the Union before filing its section 1113 motion; and 2) that the
Company refused to cooperate with the Union's financial experts
with regard to the provision of information the Union needed to
bargain.... ,207 The Steelworkers averred that such behavior could not
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1077-78.
201. Id. at 1078.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1985).
205. 44 Bankr. 907; see supra text accompanying note 140.
206. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 50 Bankr. at 975. The testimony on these
points was unrebutted.
207. Id. at 976.
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evidence good faith. 2°8 In response, the court noted that section 1113
"permits the debtor to file its application to reject any time after it
submits its proposal." 2°9 The court also found the Steelworkers'
contentions regarding the alleged failure to provide information un-
persuasive. 210
The court found, based on uncontradicted testimony, that Wheel-
ing-Pittsburgh used the most complete and reliable information avail-
able to formulate its proposal. 2 1 The court then considered whether
the proposed modifications were necessary for reorganization, and
found that the $15.20 per hour labor cost and the five-year contract
term were necessary because of the severity of Wheeling-Pittsburgh's
financial difficulties and the "critical state of the United States steel
industry. ' 21 2 The Steelworkers argued that lack of a clause raising
the labor rate if Wheeling-Pittsburgh recovered, the "snap-back"
clause, prevented all parties from being treated fairly and equitably.
213
The bankruptcy court disagreed. 21 4 It found that all parties were
treated fairly and equitably under Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal
because creditors and salaried employees also made sacrifices for the
reorganization. 21 5 The bankruptcy court also found that Wheeling-
Pittsburgh had given the Steelworkers sufficient information to eval-
uate the proposal.21 6 Because the bankruptcy court believed that
Wheeling-Pittsburgh satisfied the first seven factors of American
Provision,21 7 it found that the Steelworkers refused to accept the
debtor's proposal without good cause. 21 Lastly, the court found that
the balance of equities clearly favored rejection because
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 976-77. The Steelworkers contended that Wheeling-Pittsburgh failed
to provide their financial consultants with a requested plant tour and review the
explanation of its wage and cost system. The court stated that Wheeling-Pittsburgh,
for reasons of convenience, only delayed, and did not deny, the plant tour. With
respect to the explanation of the wage and cost system, the court found that the
Steelworkers had obtained substantially similar information when Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh sought concessions in late 1984 and early 1985. Id.
211. Id. at 977.
212. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1080.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1081.
216. Id. The court stated that the Steelworkers' financial experts already
possessed a wealth of information from previous concession. Id.
217. In Re Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 50 Bankr. at 975-83.
218. Id. at 983.
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"[riejection ... will have a significant and positive effect on Wheeling-
Pittsburgh's prospects for reorganization.
'21 9
On July 17, 1985, the bankruptcy court issued an opinion author-
izing Wheeling-Pittsburgh to reject the contract. 22 Shortly thereafter,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh rejected the agreement, cutting the labor cost to
$17.50 and implementing several other changes. 22' On July 21, 1985,
the Steelworkers struck Wheeling-Pittsburgh.
222
During the strike, the Steelworkers appealed the decision of the
bankruptcy court. 23 The district court emphasized three issues in
affirming the bankruptcy court. 224 First, the district court agreed with
the bankruptcy court that "necessary" does not mean "absolutely
essential". 22 Second, the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's
conclusion that all parties would be treated "fairly and equitably,
'226
and third, the district court let stand the bankruptcy court's finding
that Wheeling-Pittsburgh conferred in good faith, although it noted
that there was evidence of record to refute bankruptcy court's
finding. 2 7 The court also commented that the twenty-two day period
between the proposal to modify the collective bargaining agreement
and the motion to reject, which the Steelworkers found so objec-
tionable, was not "inherently unreasonable since section 1113 has no
time restraint relative to when the debtor, following the submission
of a proposal, may file its rejection application." 228 The Steelworkers
then filed a timely appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. 229
On October 15, 1985, after an eighty-seven day strike, while the
appeal to the Third Circuit was still pending, the parties reached a
tentative agreement.2 30 The agreement provided for hourly labor costs
219. Id.
220. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1078.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 52 Bankr. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
224. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1081.
225. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 52 Bankr. at 1003. The court stated that
Congress envisioned the "necessary" standard as a "more practical long range test
of a less stringent nature." Id.
226. Id. at 1005.
227. Id. at 1005-06. The district court did not indicate the evidence to which
it was referring.
228. Id. at 1006.
229. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074.
230. Id. at 1078.
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of $18 per hour. 23 1 During the strike, the plant guards at the various
Wheeling-Pittsburgh facilities, who were also represented by the
Steelworkers, remained on the job, as required by the former collec-
tive bargaining agreement. During this time, Wheeling-Pittsburgh
paid them at the unilaterally imposed wage scale of $17.50 per hour.
The company and the Steelworkers did not resolve this dispute. It
involved approximately forty-five employees and approximately
$146,000. However, the parties agreed that if rejection of the contract
was reversed on appeal, the Steelworkers would assert administrative
expense claims 23 2 on behalf of the employees who worked during the
strike.
It is an understatement that the strike was acrimonious 233 and
involved a strong personality clash. The strike was not settled until
Wheeling-Pittsburgh chairman and chief executive officer, Dennis J.
Carney, the antagonist to the Steelworkers, was removed.2 4 The
atmosphere surrounding the strike is relevant. During the early months,
the animosity between the parties prevented productive bargaining.
The circumstances were inflammatory. The company perceived that
the court, by rejecting the contract, would resolve the company's
problem. The history of American labor relations does not support
that thesis. Labor negotiations occur at the bargaining table. Courts
clearly do not settle labor disputes by judicial process. The bank-
ruptcy court did not resolve the economic dispute in Wheeling-
Pittsburgh. At best, a motion to reject the contract is an invitation
to bargain. The court of appeals' opinion set the standard for
rejection, but it was a moot issue. The parties had agreed to a new
interim contract seven months before the court of appeals issued its
decision.
Because the strike was settled before the court of appeals heard
the case, the bank creditors actually argued that the issue was moot.
235
231. Wall St. J., October 15, 1985, at 8, col. 1. The agreement contained an
escalator clause which would raise labor rates to $19 per hour based on steel prices
and the company's cash flow.
232. 11 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)(A) (1982). These expenses include "the actual
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or
commissions for various services rendered after the commencement of the case...."
Id.
233. One of the co-authors had the opportunity to observe portions of the
settlement efforts. At times, representatives of Wheeling-Pittsburgh management and
the Steelworkers would not agree to be in the same room. Such conditions are
hardly conducive to a rapid settlement.
234. Wall St. J., September 23, 1985 at 3, col. 3.
235. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1079.
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The court disagreed. 2 6 First, the court remarked that settling a
controversy does not render moot an unresolved sub-issue of the
controversy. ' ' 2 7 The court dismissed the bank's contention that the
issue of the wage differential of the plant guards was deliberately
left open by the company and the union as a "mere contrivance.
238
The banks argued that the Steelworkers had "an interest in securing
a ruling on the merits of the appeal above and beyond the satisfaction
of the plant guards' claims.... ,"239 However, the Steelworkers indi-
cated that they would accept settlement that paid the full amount of
the plant guards' claim, even if it meant withdrawal of the appeal.
24
0
The court emphatically refused to believe the banks' assertion that
if the parties were able to negotiate a labor contract estimated at
$360 million dollars, they should have been able to compromise on
$146,000.241
The court placed a greater emphasis on the $146,000 than the
banks did: "That sum is not de minimis for any company, and
particularly not for a bankrupt one. 24 2 In this context, the authors
disagree with the court of appeals' characterization of the disputed
$146,000. Although $146,000 is not de minimis in absolute terms, it
was a de minimis part of the substantive dispute over rejection of
Wheeling-Pittsburgh's plans for a reorganization. The legal resources
required to prosecute the appeal were significant. The appeal squan-
dered time and resources, which could have been used to formulate




Turning to substantive issues, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the bankruptcy court used the incorrect standard of neces-
sity. 2" The court of appeals equated "necessary" with "essential".
The court did find that the bankruptcy court and district court used
the correct standard for determining whether Wheeling-Pittsburgh's
236. Id. at 1079-80.
237. Id. As support, the court cited Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969) (seating of a member does not render moot his suit against the House of
Representatives for failure to seat him). Id.
238. Id. at 1079.
239. Id. at 1080. The Steelworkers admitted that they desired a favorable ruling
for its precedential value.
240. Id. at 1079. This fact was developed through discovery.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. As of February 29, 1988, Wheeling-Pittsburgh had not filed a plan of
reorganization; it had been granted several extensions for filing its plan.
244. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1088, 1090-91.
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proposal treated all of the parties "fairly and equitably," but that
they misapplied the standard.
245
In determining that "necessary" is synonymous with "essential",
the court reviewed the legislative history of section 1113 and discussed
the three proposals that it perceived: the Rodino proposal, 246 the
Thurmond substitute, 247 and the Packwood amendment. 248 The court
focused on the language of the Packwood amendment, which "pro-
vided that the debtor's proposal should contain 'the minimum mod-
ifications in such employees' benefits and protections that would
permit the reorganization'." 249 The court found that the language of
section 1113 as it was adopted, ("that the debtor's provide for those
necessary modifications in the employees' benefits and protections
that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor") 2 0 was
"a substitute"for the aforementioned clause of the Packwood amend-
ment.25 ' The court found support for its position in "[tihe contem-
poraneous remarks of the conferees [which] made it clear that the
provision was based on the substance of Senator Packwood's pro-
posal. ' 25 2 The remarks of various other members of Congress, as
well as Senator Packwood, satisfied the court that Congress intended
that "the substantive standard of Bildisco be overturned and that
the REA Express standard, or something similar, be reinstated.
' 253
The REA Express standard, it should be remembered, provided for
rejection only as a last resort if the debtor is in imminent danger of
collapse and the employees are threatened with a loss of their jobs.
2 4
Thus, the court believed "necessary", as it was used in section 1113,
meant "essential". 255
The court of appeals' decision, in large part, relied upon legislative
history. There is an absence of the traditional explanatory statements
or reports associated with such legislative history, and thus the
legislative history is unreliable. Other courts have not found that the
245. Id. at 1091-93.
246. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
248. See supra text accompanying note 81.
249. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1087.
250. Id. at 1087 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986)).
251. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1087.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1088 (citing Ehrenwerth & Lally-Green, supra note 91, at 953-54,
Gibson, supra note 4, at 337-30).
254. See supra text accompanying note 40.
255. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1088.
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legislative history demonstrates an intent to adopt the REA Express
standard .256
The court noted that "essential" appeared in another subsection
of section 1113 1 7 but did not attach any significance to this. The
court stated that to argue that "necessary" and "essential" have
different meanings because they appeared in different subsections of
section 1113 was a "hyper-technical argument. ' 258 The court also
discounted the importance of the statement of Senator Hatch, who
viewed section 1113 as a return to the Bildisco decision.
25 9
After the court defined "necessary", it asked "necessary" to what?
Although the statute says "necessary to permit the reorganization of
the debtor", 260 the court believed that the long term rehabilitation
of the debtor was not the concern of the conferees. 261 Rather, the
court of appeals determined that Congress was concerned with "a
somewhat shorter term goal of preventing the debtor's liquidation. ",262
Congress' use of the phrase "permit the reorganization" indicated
to the court of appeals that Congress intended to emphasize the
immediate future, rather than the long term future of the debtor.
The court also remarked "that the requirement that the debtor's
proposal contain only 'necessary' modifications ... is conjunctive with
the requirement that the proposal treat 'all the affected par-
ties ... fairly and equitably'. '"263 Such language and the legislative
history, the court found, would prevent a court from allowing
rejection merely out of equity to the parties.2 4
The court of appeals then applied its definition of "necessary" to
those items in Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal which the Steelworkers
found to be objectionable: the five-year contract term; the "worst
case" scenario underlying Wheeling-Pittsburgh's projections; and,
the lack of a "snap back" clause. 265 With respect to the five-year
256. See supra text accompanying notes 108-112; see also Note, The Standard
for Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors-Wheel-
ing-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 757, 786 (1987).
257. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
258. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1089.
259. Id.
260. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
261. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1089.
262. Id. at 1090. The district court opinion discussed necessity in the context
of "prevention of the debtor going into liquidation." In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 52
Bankr. at 1003. Nevertheless, the court of appeals criticized the district court for
approving the standard of "necessity" used by the bankruptcy court.
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contract term, the Steelworkers presented uncontradicted evidence in
the proceedings before the bankruptcy court that neither Wheeling-
Pittsburgh nor the American steel industry generally used a five-year
contract term. 26 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court found the five-
year term necessary because it anticipated that the reorganization of
Wheeling-Pittsburgh would take at least five years, and that labor
stability wduld be crucial during that time. 267 On the basis of the
record, the court of appeals was unable to agree that the five-year
term was necessary.
268
The court of appeals was less critical of the bankruptcy court's
use of Wheeling-Pittsburgh's pessimistic five-year projection, rather
than the more optimistic projection offered by the Steelworkers.
269
As support for Wheeling-Pittsburgh's position, the bankruptcy court
found that the domestic steel industry was in poor condition. 270 The
court of appeals agreed with the bankruptcy court's characterization
of the American steel industry.
271
The court of appeals was most critical of the bankruptcy court
for its failure to consider a "snap back" provision in its analysis of
necessity, although the court of appeals noted that the bankruptcy
court discussed the absence of a "snap back" provision in its analysis
of fair and equitable treatment. 272 Considering the lack of a "snap
back" clause together with a five-year contract term and the pessi-
mistic five-year projection of Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the court was
unable to accept the bankruptcy court's finding of necessity and
therefore remanded the case to the bankruptcy court.
273
The court of appeals then changed the emphasis of its analysis of
the lack of a "snap back" clause.2 74 It determined that the lack of
such clause in conjunction with a five-year agreement, based on
pessimistic projections, meant that the employees would not be
266. Id.
267. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 50 Bankr. 979. The bankruptcy court stated
that "there is no evidence as to how labor stability can be achieved with a contract
of less that five years' duration."
268. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1092.
269. Id.
270. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 50 Bankr. at 978. The bankruptcy court recited
a list of the problems then facing the domestic steel industry. Id.
271. Wheeling-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1090.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1090-91. The court of appeals also held that the district court erred
by treating the bankruptcy court's findings of necessity as merely findings of fact,




treated "fairly and equitably" if Wheeling-Pittsburgh's performance
improved during the contract term. Although the bankruptcy court
used the correct standard for fair and equitable treatment, whether
Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal would impose a disproportionate bur-
den on the employees, the court of appeals agreed with the Steel-
workers' assertion that the bankruptcy court incorrectly applied that
standard.275 According to the court of appeals, the bankruptcy court
erroneously found that Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal was fair and
equitable, even though the employees would not share in any im-
provement in the company's position.
276
It is interesting to note that the actual negotiated agreement which
the company and the Steelworkers adopted was an interim type
agreement. 7 7 It required renegotiation at the time of the adoption
of a reorganization plan. It permited the Steelworkers to bargain
again when the company presented a plan. At that time, the union
would be able to recover previous concessions. The court of appeals'
argument for a "snap back" fails to take into consideration the
claim a union can file for rejection and the short term of most labor
agreements.
C. The Second Circuit Differs-Truck Drivers
Local 807 v. Carey Transportation
The Second Circuit is the only other court of appeals to apply
section 1113. In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation
(In re Carey Transportation),278 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit unequivocally differed with the Third Circuit's interpretation
of "necessary" and "fairly and equitably". 279 In that case, Carey
Transportation ("Carey") operated a bus service between New York
275. Id. at 1092.
276. Id. The bankruptcy court dismissed such concerns by noting the proposal
did not provide for adjusting labor costs downward if Wheeling-Pittsburgh performed
worse than it projected. The district court failed to independently evaluate the fair
and equitable nature of Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh,
50 Bankr. at 980.
277. Id.
278. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
279. Previously, in Century Brass Products, Inc. v. International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (In re
Century Brass), 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit discussed § 1113,
without reaching the merits of the debtor's application for rejection. The court
stated that the Third Circuit, in Wheeling-Pittsburgh, misconstrued the nature of §
1113 as favoring labor law principles over bankruptcy principles. Id at 276.
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City and the major New York airports.280 In the years preceding
1985, when it filed for relief under Chapter 11, Carey suffered
increasing operating losses. 211 Carey obtained concessions from the
union representing its mechanics and from other creditors, but was
unable to obtain significant concessions from Local 807.282 Shortly
after Carey filed its Chapter 11 petition, it proposed to modify the
collective bargaining agreement with Local 807.283 The membership
of Local 807 opposed the proposed changes, and refused to negotiate
despite the urgings of union officials. 284 Thereafter, Carey filed a
petition to reject the contract under section 1113.285 The bankruptcy




After briefly discussing the scope of review, 288 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that the debtor must make three substantive
showings before rejection can be allowed: (1) the proposal is limited
to "those necessary modifications ... that are necessary to permit the
reorganization" and treats "creditors, the debtor and all affected
parties ... fairly and equitably, ' 28 9 (2) "[t]he union has rejected this
proposal without good cause," 2 90 and (3) "the balance of the equities
clearly favors rejection.... "291
Turning to the issue of necessity, the court asked the same questions
that the Third Circuit did in Wheeling-Pittsburgh: "[H]ow necessary
must the proposed modifications be, and ... to what goal must those
alterations be necessary? ' 292 The Second Circuit's answer differed
280. Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 85.
281. Id.
282. Id. The Teamsters represented Carey's drivers and station employees. In
1984, the Teamsters agreed to a two-tier wage system, allowing for reduced wages
and benefits to employees hired after July 1, 1984, but these concessions yielded
insignificant savings. Id.
283. Id. at 86.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. In re Carey Transp., 50 Bankr. 203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). The district
court did not publish an opinion.
287. Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 87.
288. Id. at 88. The court disagreed with Local 807 that the matter was subject
to de novo review because it involved mixed questions of law and fact. The court
of appeals held that the bankruptcy court's interpretation of § 1113 was subject to
plenary review, but any findings of fact were subject to the clearly erroneous
standard. Id.
289. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986)).
290. Id.
291. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986)).
292. Id.; See also Wheefing-Pittsburgh v. Steelworkers, 791 F.2d at 1088.
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sharply from that of the Third Circuit. First, the Second Circuit
refused to equate "necessary" with "essential". 293 Local 807 argued
that the proposed changes were not "necessary" because they resulted
in savings that exceeded the debtor's break even point, because of
the length of the contract, and because of the failure to include a
"snap back" clause. 294 The court of appeals interpreted the legislative
history to find that Congress did not adopt the Packwood
amendment 295 which provided for "minimum modifications." Rather,
the court believed that Congress adopted the "necessary" language
as a substitute for the "minimum modifications" language of the
Packwood proposal.
296
The court of appeals also approved of the additional reason the
bankruptcy court used to find that "necessary" and "essential" were
not synonymous. 297 Bankruptcy Judge Lifland declared that section
1113 required the debtor to bargain in good faith. 29 If the debtor
proposed absolute minimal changes, as Local 807 urged, it would
not have had room to bargain or negotiate. However, if it agreed to
significant changes during the bargaining process, it would be unable
to prove that its initial proposal was limited to essential changes. 29
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also found the Third
Circuit's answer to the question of 'necessary to what'... trou-
bling." 3 °0 The court criticized the Third Circuit's failure to distinguish
interim relief from other post-petition modification attempts. Totally
departing from the position of the Third Circuit in Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh, the court held that the proper consideration, in situations not
involving interim relief, is "whether rejection would increase the
likelihood of reorganization. '"301 Such an inquiry requires "looking
into the debtor's ultimate future and estimating what the debtor
needs to attain financial health, 3 a0 2 and necessarily will not be limited
to minimal changes.
293. Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 89.
294. Id. The debtor requested a three-year contract extension. The existing
agreement was to expire in eight months. The length of the contract term and the
lack of a "snap back" proposal were not raised in the lower courts, and thus could
not be raised on appeal. Id. at 90.
295. See supra text accompanying note 81.
296. Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 89.
297. Id.
298. In Re Carey Transp., 50 Bankr. at 209.
299. Id.
300. Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 89.
301. Id.
302. Id. As an example, the debtor's proposed modifications provided for
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In assessing whether the debtor's proposal treated Local 807's
employees "fairly and equitably", the court noted that the debtor
need not show that managers and non-union employees underwent
the same diminution of wages and benefits as experienced by the
union employees.3 °3 Although such a comparison would be easy, it
would be unnecessary when the debtor could make other showings
that the union members were being treated fairly and equitably.
3°4
In Carey, non-union employees had their responsibilities increased as
a result of staff cuts, without a commensurate salary increase. °0
Carey's union employees were paid significantly more than the equiv-
alent employees of Carey's competitors, while the salaries of Carey's
managers and supervisors were barely competitive.3°6 The court of
appeals also viewed the pre-petition concessions by other parties as
an indicator that those other parties had contributed fairly and
equitably. Thus, the court of appeals could not hold that the bank-
ruptcy court erred in evaluating the burdens imposed on all of the
parties.307
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the
bankruptcy court that Local 807 rejected Carey's proposal without
good cause.30 8 The bankruptcy court concluded that Local 807 lacked
good cause because the debtor's proposal was necessary and fair and
equitable.3a 9 The court of appeals expanded on the bankruptcy court's
reasoning, noting that Local 807 refused to participate in meaningful
post-petition negotiations and offered no reason for rejection other
than it believed that the debtor's proposals were excessive.31 0 If such
conduct was held to be good cause, the union would be able to
savings which greatly exceeded the debtor's break even point. Nevertheless, the court
recognized that such rejections were necessary, so that the debtor could modernize
its fleet and facilities. Query whether debtors should be able to make capital
improvements while in bankruptcy?
303. Id. at 90.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 91.
306. Id.
307. Id. Local 807 also had objected that the treatment of the debtor's parent
corporation was unfair to the other creditors. The court ruled that a creditor who
was also an owner of the debtor need not take a smaller percentage dividend than
the other creditors: "The mere fact that there have been intercompany transactions
between a debtor and its owner is not a source of unfairness to other creditors
unless the transactions themselves were financially unfair to the debtor." Id.
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"stonewall" post-petition negotiations with the hope that the court
would later find the debtor's proposal more than "necessary" or not
"fair and equitable". 3' This tactic was not what Congress envisioned
when it included the "good cause" requirement.
3 12
Finally, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
bankruptcy court's finding that the balance of equities favored re-
jection.3"3 The court noted that since section 1113 codified the re-
quirement of Bildisco that the equities balance, the factors identified
in Bildisco and in other cases preceding the enactment of section
1113 were still applicable.3 14 The court did, however, disagree with
the bankruptcy court's holding that allegations of the debtor's bad
faith were inappropriate to an objection to a section 1113 applica-
tion. 1 5
D. Trends in the Application of Section 1113
Although the case law of section 1113 is not fully developed, it
has suggested some trends. The courts generally have been unsym-
pathetic to unions who have refused to participate in meaningful pre-
application negotiations. For example, in In re Royal composing
Room, Inc. ,3' 16 the court granted the debtor's application to reject
because it was dissatisfied with the union's attempt to reach voluntary
modifications. The Court disapproved of the frequency and duration
of the bargaining sessions, which it attributed to the union and
considered the union's position "essentially a stonewall ... " which
"favors the grant of the debtor's motion for rejection. ' 31 7 Not only
311. Id.
312. Id. But see Gibson, supra note 4, at 34.
313. Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 92-93.
314. Id. at 92. The court listed six equitable considerations:
(1) [T]he likelihood and consequences of liquidation if rejection is not per-
mitted; (2) the likely reduction in the value of creditor's claims if the bargaining
agreement remains in force; (3) the likelihood and consequences of a strike if
the bargaining agreement is voided; (4) the possibility and likely effect of any
employee claims for breach of contract if rejection is approved; (5) the cost-
spreading abilities of the various parties, taking into account the number of
employees covered by the bargaining agreement and how various employees'
wages and benefits compare to those of others in the industry; and, (6) the
good or bad faith of the parties in dealing with the debtor's financial dilemma.
Id. at 93.
315. Id. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
316. 62 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
317. Id. at 408; see also Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 91-92; supra
text accompanying notes 311-12.
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did the union refuse to participate in meaningful negotiations, but it
did not "articulate and discuss in detail ... its reasons for declin-
ing ... the debtor's proposal in whole or in part.""31 The court
equated such behavior with lack of good cause for refusing the
debtor's proposal. Similarly in In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 19
the union's refusal to negotiate away medical coverage, as a matter
of policy, was not good cause for rejecting the debtor's proposal.
3 20
As was the case in Royal Composing Room, the union in Kentucky
Truck Sales also did not make a pre-hearing counteroffer.
On the other hand, rejection has not been permitted when the
debtor has been lax in fulfilling its bargaining obligations. In In re
American Provision,3 2' the court refused to allow rejection when,
inter alia, it found that the debtor engaged in only perfunctory
bargaining efforts which were not within the spirit of section 1113.322
The court noted that the debtor and the union met only once,
although the union had indicated a willingness to continue discus-
sions.323 In In re K & B Mounting,3 24 the court refused to grant the
debtor's application to reject when the debtor and the union had not
negotiated face-to-face. Just as some courts have held that a union
must articulate specific reasons why it is rejecting the debtor's pro-
posal, the debtor must also be specific.3 25 The debtor cannot rely
''on a simplistic presentation of a need to reduce labor costs to
become more competitive."
326
Courts have allowed rejection when faced with easily quantifiable
economic data which indicates that labor costs are excessive either
in relation to the debtor's revenues or in comparison to other
employers within the industry.3 27 In In re Amherst Sparkle Market,
28
the court allowed rejection when the debtor's labor costs equalled
318. 62 Bankr. at 407.
319. 52 Bankr. 797 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
320. Id. at 805.
321. 44 Bankr. 907.
322. Id. at 911.
323. Id.
324. 50 Bankr. 460.
325. Id.
326. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local No. 9 v. Mile Hi
Metal Systems, Inc. (In re Mile Hi Metal Systems, Inc.), 67 Bankr. 114, 118 (D.
Col. 1986); see also In re K & B Mounting, 50 Bankr. 464-67; supra text accom-
panying notes 156-160.
327. See, e.g., In re Allied Delivery, 49 Bankr. at 702; supra text accompanying
note 172.
328. 75 Bankr. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
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13.080%0 of sales versus an industry average of 8.6070.329 In In re Royal
Composing Room,330 the court allowed rejection when the debtor's
labor costs were excessive when compared to the industry,."1 The
debtor was unable to compete because it was one of the few remaining
union shops in that particular industry. Even when labor costs may
be average for an industry, rejection may be allowed when they
comprise a disproportionate percentage of the debtor's fixed over-
head. 32 However, when labor costs under the collective bargaining
agreements are minimal, the court may find that the debtor's proposal
is not necessary to its reorganization.
33
Numerous courts have allowed rejection when the debtor has cut
all other possible costs before seeking rejection.3 34 Indeed, one court
has commented that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement,
in light of the "history of the collective bargaining agreement and
its special treatment and protection, ' 35 should be considered a last
resort. Generally, by the time the debtor seeks rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement, all of the other employees will have
been subjected to reductions in wages and benefits.3 6 This showing
will often be crucial if the court is to find that the debtor's proposal
treats all parties fairly and equitably. However, this does not always
need to be the case.
337 °
Inclusion of a "snap back" clause is one method of ensuring that
the debtor's proposal treats all parties "fairly and equitably." How-
ever, except for the Third Circuit, other courts have not required
329. Id. at 851.
330. 62 Bankr. 403.
331. Id. at 412.
332. In re Kentucky Truck Sales, 52 Bankr. at 803 n.16.
333. See American Provision, 44 Bankr. at 910; supra text accompanying note
150.
334. In re Kentucky Truck Sales, 52 Bankr. 797, 802 ("[P]roposed concessions
were critical if the company wished to survive as a viable business entity."); In re
Royal Composing Room, 62 Bankr. at 412 ("Union labor cost ... is the only expense
that has not been cut in the last four years."); In re Walway Co., 69 Bankr. 967,
973 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[Tlhe debtor has shown that cost-saving cuts have
been made in other areas, and that these measures did not increase the company's
chances of survival. The last measure sought by the debtor was the modification of
the labor contract.").
335. In re Walway, 69 Bankr. 973 n.15.
336. See, e.g., In re Amherst Sparkle Market, 75 Bankr. 847; In re Kentucky
Truck Sales, 52 Bankr. 797.
337. In re Royal Composing Room, 62 Bankr. 403 (Executives' compensation
was justified because of their indispensability to the corporation and the availability
of more lucrative opportunities).
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this result. One court has observed that there is no authority man-
dating a "snap back" clause. 38 The Third Circuit in Wheeling-
Pittsburgh was concerned that the Steelworkers receive a quid pro
quo in exchange for the concessions sought by the company. A
bankruptcy reorganization plan most often requires concessions from
many creditors. Labor agreements are usually two-three years in
terms, providing an opportunity to redress an unfavorable contract.
Retention of the employees' jobs, even at a reduced wage, has a
high priority for the employees. Retention of the employees' jobs
becomes their quid pro quo.
The actual experience indicates that rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement has not been used as an offensive tactic in
labor relations. The various equitable requirements of section 1113
reinforce that experience and prevent employers from using it in this
manner. This result was clearly intended by Congress. The debtor
who files an application to reject the collective bargaining agreement
with an anti-union animus, faces the prospect of having its bank-
ruptcy petition dismissed and its application for rejection denied.
Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code339 empowers a party in
interest to seek conversion to Chapter 7 or dismissal for cause.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically empower courts
to dismiss cases filed in bad faith, there is precedent for this course
of action3'4 and such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative
history. 41 To date, there are no reported decisions in which a union
has successfully moved for dismissal because of a bad faith filing.
However, courts have recognized that a bankruptcy filing for the
purpose of eliminating a union may be a bad faith filing subject to
dismissal.
342
338. In re Walway, 69 Bankr. at 974.
339. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
340. See, e.g., In re Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.
1986); In re Southern California Sound Systems, Inc., 69 Bankr. 893 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1987).
341. 130 Cong. Rec. H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Morrison)." [Ilt was also our understanding that a Chapter 11 reorganization case
that is brought for the sole purpose or (sic) repudiating or modifying a collective
bargaining agreement is a case brought in bad faith." Id.
342. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 Bankr. 67, 71 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1984). "That one of the intentions of the debtor was to seek rejection
of their collective bargaining agreements insofar as that may be allowed under the
provisions of Title 11, does not, under these facts, result in the filing being 'in bad
faith .....'"; In re Carey Transp., 50 Bankr. 203, 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
("[T]he ... claim that the case was filed solely to jettison [the] union contract ... is
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IV. THE NECESSITY OF BARGAINING-LABOR PEACE REQUIRES
GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS, NOT LEGAL PROCESS
In the United States, judicial process has not proved salutary in
resolving labor management matters. It is unreal to expect precise
results when the judicial process is involuntarily applied to labor
management negotiations. It is not clear that the drafters of section
1113 expected it to be so used. This same economic unreality is also
present when non-labor bargaining is forced into the courtroom. The
reorganization process envisions that the parties will negotiate most
matters in good faith. Reliance on the judicial process may actually
delay the inevitable bargaining process if it encourages the parties to
think that they need not bargain and that the courts will provide an
answer.
The ultimate economic answer lies in the market place. Well-
informed, good faith bargaining should approximate the market
place. Although the judicial process can also approximate the market
place, it is clumsy and restrictive and enforcement is not possible
when labor is the creditor.
When this bargaining process has been unsuccessful, bringing the
dispute to the courtroom in the form of .a section 1113 rejection
does not resolve much. It can harden positions and waste valuable
time.
In enterprises which are labor intensive, the employees tend to be
represented by a strong union. In such enterprises labor leaders
should become major participants in the economic bargaining that
must occur among all the creditors. Without labor's broad partici-
pation, a successful reorganization is unlikely. The consequences of
a failure to bargain and reorganize are great. Failure means that
secured creditors will receive poor value for their collateral, active
employees will lose their jobs, retired employees will lose part of
their pensions, and unsecured creditors will lose everything. Chapter
11 reorganization procedures consist of a series of guidelines, backed
by legal authority, designed to encourage voluntary modification by
creditors of their previous "legal" rights. It is intended to maximize
more appropriate fodder for dismissal considerations under § 1112(b) of the Code,
or for a motion by a party in interest such as the Union here ... to appoint a trustee
or examiner under Code § 1104.", aff'd, Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp.,
Inc., 816 F.2d 82. The court of appeals did note that allegations of bad faith were
appropriate to an objection to a § 1113 application as well as the basis for a motion
to dismiss or to appoint a trustee or examiner.
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over the longer term the actual return to be received by all creditors.
It is based on realistic self interest. Each creditor group must analyze
their prospects under the plan and vote yes or no.1
43
However, labor is a unique creditor. Labor creditors are not
completely subject to a two-thirds majority vote3" and the cram
down3 45 provisions because of their strike power. Rejection of the
labor contract does not change the designated bargaining agent or
unit. The union continues to exist and is free to strike. An active
and strong union will require a new contract.
Further, rejection of the pre-petition labor contract does not de-
termine the actual economic provisions to be adopted in the post-
petition labor contracts. Most labor contracts are limited to relatively
short periods of time, such as one, two, or three years. Success of
the reorganized enterprise offers new opportunities to renegotiate
contracts in the future. This is not the case for other creditors.
It should be obvious (but it has not been) that unless a new labor
agreement is negotiated, a strong labor organization will strike when
their contract is rejected. In an ongoing business, a strike is likely
even if the courts determine by strict standards that rejection is
appropriate. Strongly represented employees are conditioned to work
only when a contract is in place. The Bankruptcy Code does not
provide the court with unique ability to prevent such a strike.
This may not be the condition when the union is disorganized. A
weak or disorganized union may be forced to accede to rejection and
to the debtor's proposal. Obviously, in these situations, the court
should proceed carefully so as to maintain the needed equity balance.
The early cases, which provoked labor leaders, involved relatively
disorganized responses by the labor organizations. It is not really
accurate to attribute those concessions to the bankruptcy contract
rejection power alone. A union that cannot maintain an effective
343. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1982).
344. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982). This section provides that a class of claims
has accepted a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization if "at least two-thirds in amount
and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such class," which
actually vote, accept the plan.
345. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b)(1) (1982 and Supp. IV 1986). This section provides
that the bankruptcy court shall confirm the plan, even if all classes of creditors
have not voted for confirmation, if at least one impaired class of claims has voted
to accept the plan, "the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable,
with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not




strike as a last resort has lost its ultimate bargaining weapon. Other
economic factors should be examined to explain the union's disor-
ganized response in the early cases. By itself, the bankruptcy power
to reject the labor contract does not explain the result.
In industries with strong union traditions, such as the steel industry,
attempts to reject the contract without a concurrent renegotiation
are sterile exercises. In Wheeling-Pittsburgh, after rejection and a
long strike, a new interim contract was negotiated.3 46 Without a
renegotiated contract, the company had little hope of developing the
plan of reorganization.
In Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the need for a new labor contract became
an economic necessity and an actual fact before the court of appeals
determined that the rejection of the contract had occurred without
the required standard of legal precision. Surely in an economic sense
the court of appeals decided an economic issue that was moot. If
the strike continued and the parties waited seven months until the
court of appeals decided the standard for rejection, the most likely
result would have been liquidation. Conversely, if the bankruptcy
court had not rejected the contract and the union not renegotiated
the contract, the result would also have been liquidation. These
economic facts provide the legal result with an unreal quality. This
is likely to be so in many other cases, because reorganization is
essentially an economic process.
In the LTV bankruptcy, the parties may have learned from the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh experience . 47 The contract was amicably rene-
gotiated. In LTV, labor and management avoided the pitfalls of the
legal process . 4 Whether the labor contract which was renegotiated
avoided the economic problems faced by LTV is yet to be determined.
It is important to observe that these renegotiated contracts are also
of an interim nature. The contracts are limited to a time near the
346. See supra text accompanying notes 219-231.
347. LTV Corp., a conglomerate which includes the nation's second largest
steel manufacturer, filed for relief under Chapter 11 on July 17, 1986.
348. Query how much has LTV learned? Although it was able to renegotiate
its collective bargaining agreement, it caused labor unrest and litigation by unilaterally
terminating the life insurance and health benefits of its retirees. See United Steel-
workers of America v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 76 Bankr. 937 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987). In response, Congress passed stop-gap legislation to reinstate the
benefits. Congress is currently considering legislation to limit the ability of a debtor
in possession to terminate insurance benefits to retirees. See H.R. 2969, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. H8552 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1987); 133 Cong. Rec. S15590
(daily ed. Oct. 30, 1987).
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confirmation of the plan. Therein lies the rub. This practical result
is an economic admission of the need to balance all the economic
forces through the process of a plan. In Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the
pre-petition dispute between the management and the union over
pledging the current assets as collateral reflected the union's early
understanding that an asset crucial to the debtor's restructuring was
being negotiated away without the union's participation. That issue
is usually not a labor-management dispute, but it became so as a
part of the total plan of reorganization. The company was about to
collateralize an important asset and was asking the union concurrently
to reduce its contract wages. Those economically related acts needed
to be legally coordinated or tied together by a plan of reorganization.
For all creditors, voluntary negotiation is the essence of the Chapter
11 plan process. Debtors in possession may need more than the 120
days provided in the statute in order to prepare a plan.149 Judges
should consider using the exclusivity period to encourage such bar-
gaining at every level. Frequently the bargaining is slow to get started,
and is not realistic. Judges have tended to extend the 120 day limit
easily. Easy extensions do not encourage the needed bargaining. Once
protected by the automatic stay, debtors do not want to leave that
safe harbor. The parties sometimes attempt to solve every conceivable
debtor/creditor problem before the plan is presented. The profes-
sionals, attorneys, accountants, etc. often do not act to hasten the
reorganization. A quick and prompt plan does not maximize their
fees, but delay does. This is a matter Congress should address.
Courts and creditors have been reluctant to force the issue. When
judges easily extend the exclusivity period without conditions, and
creditors do not oppose the extension or file their own plan of
reorganization, the debtor in possession gets comfortable and refuses
to leave the safe harbor with a negotiated plan. To encourage the
bargaining process, judges should not extend the exclusivity period.
Labor creditors are different than other creditors. When non-labor
creditors do not voluntarily accept the plan, the court can take
evidence, cram down or deny the plan. When dealing with personal
property and capital, the court's determination of these matters can
be enforced by legal process. However, when dealing with labor,
rejection may be ineffective if employees choose to strike. Only
voluntary negotiations produce the desired result.
349. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982). This section provides that "only the debtor
may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief ...."
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The bankruptcy legal process should not enable the parties to
receive more than the market place permits them to obtain at the
bargaining table. Section 1113 encourages the debtor and labor to
bargain. It encourages a complete exchange of the relevant infor-
mation. If by hard bargaining labor creditors achieve more than the
market place can support, labor will have achieved a pyrrhic victory.
If the terms do not permit the enterprise to prosper after reorgani-
zation, the debtor will fail. If the debtor obtains too many concessions
from labor, in two to three years when the contract expires, labor
can correct the situation and adjust the balance again.
V. CONCLUSION
Before the Bildisco decision, courts used varying standards to allow
Chapter 11 debtors to reject collective bargaining agreements. The
Second Circuit followed the REA Express standard, which permitted
rejection as a last resort to save a debtor in imminent danger of
collapse. Other courts, such as the Third and Eleventh Circuits, used
a relaxed standard, allowing rejection if the collective bargaining
agreement burdens the estate and the equities balance in favor of
rejection. In Bildisco the United States Supreme Court resolved the
conflict by adopting the latter standard. The Court also held that
unilateral rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is not an
unfair labor practice. That aspect of the decision particularly incensed
organized labor.
Organized labor mounted an intense effort to legislatively overrule
Bildisco, while business and creditor interests lobbied to retain Bi-
disco's beneficial effect. The resultant legislation, section 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code, is an accommodation to both of those interests.
On one hand, it recognizes the most serious concerns of organized
labor by prohibiting a debtor from unilaterally rejecting a collective
bargaining agreement. Instead, debtors must now seek the permission
of the bankruptcy court to reject. Before doing so, the debtor must
bargain with the union over the proposed changes to the collective
bargaining agreement, and must provide the union with sufficient
information to evaluate the proposed changes.
On the other hand, section 1113 adopts the equitable, subjective
standard for rejection set forth in Bildisco. The statute utilizes
numerous terms of compromise, which have generated some litiga-
tion. In the cases reported to date, courts have generally interpreted
section 1113 in a common sense manner. Both the debtor and the
union must participate in meaningful negotiations. The proposed
1987l
226 DUQUESNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:181
modifications, or the union's rejection of them, must be easily
quantifiable with respect to the debtor's reorganization.
The better course of action, however, is to avoid rejection litiga-
tion. This is accomplished through bargaining. The courts can use
their considerable equitable power to require earnest bargaining. The
courts should not allow the judicial process to be used to tilt the
power balance. Nor should the courts allow the judicial process to
be used as a substitute for bargaining. The union and the debtor
must focus on the economic realities of their situation, rather than
the strength of their respective legal positions. Rejection of the
contract may decide technical matters related to claims on liquidation.
It will be a waste of time if it does not result in a new economic
bargain.
